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12 Myths about
Individual Accounts for
Social Security Reform
This article highlights research from John
Turner's new book, Individual Accounts
for Social Security Reform International
Perspectives on the U.S. Debate, which was
published by the Upjohn Institute. See p. 7 for
details.

JL he recent federal budget proposal
provides hundreds of billions of dollars
to establish individual accounts as part
of Social Security reform. The budget
includes funding necessary to establish
voluntary carve-out accounts, which are
accounts that would partially replace
Social Security. Workers who choose
these accounts would receive reduced
Social Security benefits, and in exchange
would have part of their retirement
income based on the investment
performance of the account. The United
Kingdom is the only high-income country
that uses these accounts, but the number
of British workers participating in them
has declined by about 20 percent since
its peak in 1993, despite growth in the
labor force. The Pensions Commission,
a national commission in the United
Kingdom assigned to propose major
reforms, has recommended abolishing
those accounts.
This article examines 12 myths about
individual accounts and how they would
work if they were an option for Social
Security participants. These myths persist
because they contain elements of truth,
though usually in a different context. For

example, some myths about voluntary
carve-out accounts are true statements
for mandatory add-on accounts that
would be provided in addition to
Social Security. Some myths are true in
idealized situations but not in the actual
implementation of individual accounts.
Some contain elements of truth that are
outweighed by other considerations in a
more complete analysis.

Myth 1. Voluntary carve-out accounts
are similar to 401(k) plans or the Thrift
Savings Plan for federal government
workers.
All three are individual accounts, and
some lessons can be learned from the
experience with 401(k) plans and the
Thrift Savings Plan. However, in this
context the salient feature of 401(k) plans
and the Thrift Savings Plan is that both
are add-on account plans. They do not
reduce workers' Social Security benefits,
as would occur for voluntary carve-out
accounts. In addition, the Thrift Savings
Plan's reported administrative cost, often
considered a benchmark, considerably
understates the cost of a Social Security
program of individual accounts because
the government subsidizes the Thrift
Savings Plan's administrative costs.
Myth 2. Voluntary carve-out accounts
would foster an ownership society.
Workers own outright their 401(k)
plan accounts. However, with a voluntary
carve-out account, while workers own the
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balance in the account, the money used
to fund the account is a loan that workers
must pay back with interest through a cut
in their future Social Security benefits.
Thus, voluntary carve-out accounts could
be characterized as fostering a debt
society.
Myth 3. Voluntary carve-out accounts
would increase national savings.
Whether add-on accounts increase
national savings is controversial (Orszag
and Stiglitz 2001). However, voluntary
carve-out accounts are much less likely to
do so. The worker finances them through
the implicit borrowing from the Social
Security program. Also, the government
would likely borrow for at least part of
the transition costs of paying current
retirees' benefits.
Myth 4. Workers would only choose
a voluntary carve-out account if that
choice made them better off.
Well-informed workers making
rational decisions who voluntarily
choose an option are made better off.
However, in the United Kingdom, many
workers who have chosen voluntary
carve-out accounts have been made
worse off because they were wrongfully
influenced in the "misselling" scandal.
The magnitude of their errors is immense.
These workers have been reimbursed $26
billion by financial service providers in
an economy a sixth as large as United
States.'

experience has shown that because they
are created by legislators in a political
environment, they frequently are subject
to political risk. For example, in Sweden,
the default fund, which most new
participants invest in, does not invest
in Coca Cola because of the Swedish
government's objections to some of Coca
Cola's policies.
Myth 7. Individual accounts would
reduce government involvement in the
retirement income system.
The government would probably
provide a reduced percentage of
retirement income if there were Social
Security individual accounts. However,
the Social Security Administration's
bureaucracy could easily double due
to the recordkeeping requirements for
voluntary carve-out accounts (Hart et al.
2001). The government would also have
an expanded role through its regulatory
oversight of individual accounts.

Myth 5. A worker's survivors would
be better off if the worker chose a
voluntary carve-out account.
Survivors could inherit the balance of
the individual account if the account has
not been annuitized. However, the worker
with a voluntary carve-out account would
give up some of the survivors insurance
that Social Security provides. If that
worker dies at a young age, the account
balance would be small, and the survivors
would generally be better off with the
full survivor benefits that Social Security
provides.

Myth 8. Low-income workers would be
better off with individual accounts.
Low-income workers tend to not
own stock; thus, having an individual
account could diversify their sources of
retirement income. However, workers
with low income are poorly situated to
bear stock market risk because of their
limited ability to absorb downside risk.
Also, the rate of return that low-income
workers receive from Social Security
tends to be higher than for higher-income
workers because of the progressivity of
Social Security's benefit formula. The
taxation of the Social Security benefits
of higher earners further reduces their
rate of return from Social Security. Thus,
high-income workers have more to gain
from individual accounts that substitute
for Social Security than do low-income
workers. In addition, the level of financial
literacy among low-income workers tends
to be low, so they would be more prone
to costly investment errors. Relatively
few low-income workers in the United
Kingdom participate in the voluntary
carve-out individual accounts.

Myth 6. Individual accounts would be
free from political risk.
Individual accounts, in principle, can
be managed so that they are free from
political risk. However, international

Myth 9. Workers would be good
financial managers of their individual
accounts.
Some workers would be good
financial managers. However, experience

with 401(k) plans and the mandatory
individual accounts in Sweden indicates
that many workers make errors in
choosing their investments and in the
timing of changes in their investments.
Some workers follow trends, buying
high and selling low. Many workers who
are financially vulnerable have a low
level of financial literacy, and lack of
financial literacy appears to be a cause
of workers making investment errors.
Demographic literacy is also important.
Surveys have found that many workers
underestimate their life expectancy, and
do not understand the probability of
living longer than their life expectancy,
which would cause them to plan for a
shorter retirement period than they likely
will experience.
Myth 10. The rate of return workers
receive from individual accounts would
be higher than what they receive from
Social Security.
Stocks on average earn a higher
gross rate of return than the implicit
rate of return workers receive on
their contributions to Social Security.
However, if appropriate adjustments are
made, on average the two rates of return
would be equivalent (Brown, Hassett,
and Smetters 2005). Those adjustments
include taking into account the higher
risk in stocks, the higher administrative
costs of individual accounts, the value
of the various forms of insurance
Social Security provides, the cost of
annuitization of account balances, and
the higher taxes ultimately needed to pay
transition costs to an individual account
system. The comparison also assumes
that workers do not make serious errors
in financial management.
Myth 11. Individual accounts would
not redistribute income.
Individual accounts can be disbursed
as lump sum benefits, which do not
redistribute income. However, when
they are annuitized, they perversely
(regressively) redistribute income from
low- to high-wage workers who tend
to have longer life expectancy and thus
receive benefits for more years. If lowerincome workers receive lower rates of
return than higher-income workers, that
would also cause an adverse change in
the distribution of retirement income.
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Myth 12. Individual accounts would
not affect labor supply and retirement
age because they closely link
contributions and benefits.
There is a close link between
contributions and the amount invested in
an individual account. Also, individual
accounts would not be financed by an
explicit tax, which would distort labor
supply. However, the volatility in stock
and bond markets causes there to be
a weak link between contributions
and benefits. Further, a mandatory
contribution, whatever its link to
benefits, can be an implicit tax because
it is mandatory. If the mandatory
contributions act like an implicit tax, that
would discourage workers from working
and encourage them to retire. The low
participation rates of workers in Latin
American mandatory accounts may
result from such an effect on their labor
supply. In addition, a sharp downturn in
equity markets can cause workers with
individual accounts to delay retirement,
with that effect occurring at a time when
the demand for labor is reduced.
John Turner is a senior policy advisor
at the AARP Public Policy Institute in
Washington, D.C.
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Earnings Losses
for Injured Workers
S
' ince publishing Adequacy of
Earnings Replacement in Workers'
Compensation Programs in 2004 (Hunt
2004), staff at the Upjohn Institute have
continued to analyze the important
policy issues discussed in the report. The
National Academy of Social Insurance
(NASI) study panel that produced the
report found that earnings replacement
for permanent partial disabilities
in five states ranged from 29 to 46
percent a rate far short of the 67 percent
replacement rate specified by statute
in these state workers' compensation
systems. Thus, the analysis raised
concerns about the adequacy of workers'
compensation earnings replacement
benefits.

The NASI study panel's
analysis raised concerns about
the adequacy of workers'
compensation earnings
replacement benefits.
However, there were some problems
with these findings. First, employer
representatives on the study panel
objected to using the two-thirds
earnings replacement standard for
permanent partial disability (PPD)
cases. They asserted that because
such cases are frequently disputed
and their compensation may be the
result of compromise settlements, it
is inappropriate to expect such claims
to achieve the two-thirds standard.
Therefore, the study panel believed
it would be beneficial to assess the
adequacy of temporary total disability
benefits.
In addition, there were analytical
issues that affected the results, even
though the same assumptions had been
used for studying the five states. Because

the analysis focused on aggregate wage
losses and aggregate compensation
payments, it implicitly weighted the
more serious claims more heavily. The
longer the wage loss continues, the more
times the injured worker is counted in
the aggregate wage losses. But is the
policy question, what proportion of all
the wages lost by injured workers is
replaced? Or is it, what proportion of all
injured workers received adequate wage
replacement? The earlier studies answer
the first question, but not the second.
Data Analysis
To find the answer to that question,
the Upjohn Institute contracted with the
State of Oregon for administrative data
that enabled us to perform a sensitivity
analysis of benefit adequacy in Oregon's
workers' compensation system. Our
empirical work uses a dataset composed
of 46,033 Oregon workers injured
in 1992 or 1993. They all received
temporary disability payments of at
least three days, or PPD compensation.
We exclude workers with disabilities
lasting less than three days, and those
with missing values for certain key
variables. We also exclude workers aged
51 and older at the time of injury in
order to reduce the effect of voluntary
early retirement on postinjury wage loss
calculations.
We have unemployment insurance
data, which consist of quarterly wage
records for all Oregon workers from the
first quarter of 1988 through the fourth
quarter of 1998. We were able to match
98.8 percent of injured workers to their
administrative wage records (based on a
unique but anonymous identifier provided
for each worker). The resulting dataset
combines claims-related data such as date
and type of injury, compensation benefits,
length of absence from work, and
demographic variables, with the pre- and
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Figure 1 Changes in Quarterly Wages Relative to Own Preinjury Wage, Injured
Workers (age < 50), and a Sample of Uninjured Workers
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postinjury wage record for each injured
worker. We include 5 preinjury quarters,
the quarter of injury, and 20 postinjury
quarters.
The cumulative wage change is
calculated by summing the differences
between observed postinjury quarterly
wages and the wage in the preinjury
quarter for each injured worker. We
include 20 postinjury quarters, although
we do not observe earnings in all of
them for many of the workers, due to the
incidence of missing (unreported) wages.
Finally, we compute the wage growth for
uninjured workers using the same method
and use it as a baseline against which
to assess the earnings losses of injured
workers.

to $23,892, or 31 percent, during these
years. So the average increase in real
annual earnings for uninjured workers
in Oregon during our observation period
was $5,586, and the total increase over
the period was almost $10,000.
On average, the 7,480 Oregon workers
who suffered a short-term total temporary
disability injury (3-7 lost workdays) in
1992 and 1993 had an earnings loss over
five years of $1,123 when compared
to the random sample of uninjured
Oregon workers from the same period.

Earnings Losses

Interestingly, only $212 of this earnings
loss occurs in the actual quarter of injury.
So there appears to be a persistent wage
loss for even these relatively mild injuries
in Oregon.
For moderate injuries involving
between 8 and 30 days of work lost, the
average five-year wage loss compared
to uninjured workers is $3,545. Serious
injuries involving 31-60 days lost work
(6-12 weeks) carry commensurately
more serious wage losses of $6,422.
Severe injuries involving more than 60
lost workdays mean an average earnings

Using a 10 percent random sample
of all unemployment insurance wage
records in Oregon, and ignoring the
observations with zero for wages (a
mixture of those who really had no
earnings and those whose earnings were
not reported), we find that the typical
Oregon worker's cumulative earnings
increased by $9,943 in 1993 dollars in the
five years from 1993 to 1998. Average
annual real earnings for uninjured
Oregon workers increased from $18,306

Wage losses associated with
workers' compensation claims
may be permanent.

loss of $10,359 compared to uninjured
workers.
Figure 1 shows these results. Starting
from the preinjury quarterly earnings
at time t = —l, the earnings of injured
workers (except the 3-7 day group)
decline in the quarter of injury (t = 0)
and in the following quarter (t= 1).
Then earnings begin to recover but never
overtake the earnings of the uninjured
workers, at least not within five years. It
takes two quarters for earnings to recover
to the preinjury level for those with 8-30
days lost. It takes three quarters for those
with paid disability durations of 31-60
days, and 7 quarters for those losing
more than 60 days (12 weeks) of work
to a workers' compensation claim. In
fact, at the end of five years, those who
were originally off work for more than 60
days were still suffering earnings losses
of nearly $500 per quarter compared to
the earnings gains of uninjured workers.
Permanent partial disability claimants
recover their preinjury earnings by 6
quarters following injury, but after 5
years (20 quarters) they have similar
continuing losses of just over $500 per
quarter.

Earnings Replacement
Wage losses continue long after one
might have assumed the effects of the
injury would have ended. In fact, Figure
1 shows that wage losses associated
with workers' compensation claims may
be permanent. Evidently the injury has
produced an interruption in the income
stream that is never fully recovered, even
for injuries involving as little as 8 days
off work. While wage growth returns
to something like the same rate as for
uninjured workers, the initial loss is never
made up. So the question is, how is the
workers' compensation system dealing
with these losses?
Table 1 shows the mean wage loss,
mean compensation paid, and real
earnings replacement rates for the paid
disability duration classes used earlier.
Again, we used the preinjury earnings
for each individual and accumulated
losses for five years following the injury,
as compared to the earnings growth of
uninjured Oregon workers. Under these
assumptions, it appears that the actual
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Table 1 Estimated Losses, Compensation, and Replacement Rates,
by Paid Disability Duration
Groups by paid
duration of disability
TTD
TTD
TTD
TTD
PPD

3-7 days
8-30 days
3 1-60 days
> 60 days

N

Aggregate real
replacement rate
(%)

Mean
earnings loss
(1993 $)

Mean
compensation
(1993 $)

7,480
9,303
3,162
2,468
12,655

23.9
23.1
31.6
68.7
152.6

1,123
3,545
6,422
10,359
8,764

268
820
2,028
7,117
13,373

wage-loss replacement rate increases
with the duration of disability, with PPD
claimants doing the best. Of course, it
should be pointed out that, under the
assumption that the PPD claimants have
lifelong (or permanent) impairments,
their earnings losses will continue far
beyond the five-year mark.
This in turn will serve to lower the
replacement rate since nearly all workers'
compensation payments have been
completed within five years while the
losses continue, presumably far beyond.
But the real surprise is the continuing

nature of earnings losses after five years.
Conclusion
Although it is clear that compensable
workers' compensation injuries involve
significant permanent wage loss for
many workers, it is not clear why.
Is this more like a displaced worker
phenomenon? Research from the Workers
Compensation Research Institute (2006)
highlights the fact that a significant
minority of injured workers do not
achieve a "substantial" return to work,

ranging from 10 percent in Wisconsin
and Pennsylvania to 25 percent in Texas.
We need a better understanding of this
research before reaching a definitive
judgment of the adequacy of workers'
compensation earnings replacement
benefits.
H. Allan Hunt is assistant executive
director, Kelly DeRango is a research fellow,
and Eva Madly is a research associate, all at
the Upjohn Institute.
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Mini-grant-Funded Research
The Economics of Voluntary
Disclosure in SAT Scores
Gabrielle Chapman, Michael Conlin,
and Stacy Dickert-Conlin
Syracuse University
An increasing number of colleges
have made reporting SAT I (the twopart standardized verbal and math test)
scores voluntary. These schools argue
that the test score differentials in the SAT
are not a result of aptitude differences
but rather biases in the test that favors
particular groups. The game theoretic
models of voluntary disclosure suggests
that if revealing SAT scores is voluntary
and slightly costly, only those students
with the low SAT scores will withhold
their scores (i.e., the "unraveling"
equilibrium). All others will reveal their
scores to avoid the assumption that
they have extremely low scores. Using
proprietary admissions data from a
college with such a policy, we find that

this trend generally holds for students
with very high SAT scores even
conditional on observables, these students
submit their SAT scores. Yet, applicants
with relatively low SAT scores are less
likely to withhold their scores than
students with midrange SAT scores.
In addition to testing the theory of
voluntary disclosure, two other trends in
education policy and practice motivate
this research. The first is the paradox
represented by this trend toward making
standardized test scores optional in
college admissions paired with the
increased reliance on standardized
testing in other education arenas, such
the estimated $500 million per year test
preparation industry and President Bush's
education reform agenda. That agenda
includes the No Child Left Behind Act
of 2001, which requires states to develop
a grade by grade standardized testing
system as a measure of accountability.
The second motivating policy issue
for our research is the ongoing policy

challenge in higher education that seeks
to equalize college access, particularly
among those students historically most
underrepresented. The differential effect
on college access of making SAT scores
optional in the admission process has
not been thoroughly evaluated. After
conditioning on observables, we find
evidence that female applicants are still
more likely to not submit their SAT
scores, but we find very little evidence
that the same is true for minorities.

The Educational Progress of
Immigrant Children:
California in Perspective
Deborah Garvey
Santa Clara University
Twenty percent of children under age
18 in the United States had at least one
immigrant parent in 2000. In California,
by contrast, the share was more than
double at nearly 50 percent. Since
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immigrant youth will probably comprise
the majority of California's workforce,
understanding the determinants of
immigrants' educational attainment
is imperative. In studies funded by a
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research Mini-Grant, I examined student
enrollment and achievement in California
and national data.
Analyses find that California's first
generation immigrants, especially
Mexicans and other Hispanics, are at
greatest risk of being ill-prepared to
navigate the education-driven American
labor market. These findings buttress the
importance of targeting resources on the
limited-English proficient population.
English language learners need to be
brought "up-to-speed" linguistically
so that they can handle the challenging
courses necessary to successfully
complete their careers and to prepare for
postsecondary schooling.
These studies represent a first pass
at isolating the effect of generational
status on student achievement. Future
work needs to examine how mediating
influences such as parental engagement
in schooling, family socioeconomic
characteristics, and school inputs vary
across race and ethnic groups within and
across generations.

Single Mothers Working at
Night: Standard Work, Child
Care Subsidies, and Implications
for Welfare Reform
Erdal Tekin
Georgia State University
Working outside the "standard"
weekday hours of 8 a.m. to 6 p.m.
between Monday and Friday is an
increasingly common practice in the
United States. For example, in 1995,
34.3 percent of all female workers in the
United States were nonstandard workers.
The investigation of nonstandard work is
important for a number of reasons. First,
workers engaged in nonstandard work
are more likely to be assigned to routine
jobs and to receive less training and fewer
promotions than others. Consequently,
these workers tend to earn less and
are less likely than standard workers

to have health insurance and pension
benefits. Second, nonstandard work is
linked to a number of adverse outcomes
for parents and children, such as work
and family conflicts, marital instability,
health problems for both parents and
children, and poor educational outcomes
for children. Finally, the majority
of nonstandard workers work such
schedules involuntarily and view their
employment during nonstandard hours as
an accommodation to labor market needs,
not as a personal preference.
With the passage of welfare reform in
1996, child care assistance has become
a significant tool for helping welfare
recipients move into the workforce and
for helping other low-income families
stay off welfare. Almost eight years after
the welfare reform bill, Congress now
debates legislation to reauthorize welfare
reform, and child care funding remains a
key issue. However, little is known about
whether child care subsidies have in fact
played a role in increasing employment
among welfare recipients, or in general,
among low income individuals in the
post-welfare reform period. Even less is
known about the effect of these subsidies
on standard/nonstandard employment
decisions of these individuals.
Since the passage of welfare reform,
the employment rate of single mothers
has continued to rise. However, leaving
welfare does not necessarily mean
gaining adequate work and increasing
economic self-sufficiency. Over threequarters (78 percent) of employed lowincome single mothers are concentrated
in typically low-wage and low- benefit
occupations. These occupations typically
demand a greater number of hours
outside the standard weekday times of 8
a.m. to 6 p.m. Welfare reform might have
been successful so far in helping welfare
participants secure entry-level jobs.
However, there is a great deal of concern
over the possibility that many former
welfare recipients who have gone to
work are having difficulty finding stable
employment and are working at jobs with
low wages and few benefits. I examine
the capability of child care subsidies to
help mothers find jobs with conventional
or standard schedules, the kind of jobs
that usually pay higher wages, provide

better benefits, and lead to long-term
economic self-sufficiency of parents.
My research also provides insight into
whether the effect of child care subsidies
on standard employment differs between
welfare recipients and nonrecipients. This
investigation is particularly important
because many states give priority to
families leaving welfare for child care
assistance.
The empirical analysis uses data from
the 1999 National Survey of America's
Families (NSAF), conducted by the
Urban Institute. Results suggest that
child care subsidy receipt is associated
with a 6.9-percentage-point increase
in the probability of single mothers'
working at standard jobs. When the
effect of subsidy receipt is allowed to
differ between welfare recipients and
nonrecipients, results indicate that
welfare recipients who are offered a child
care subsidy are 14 percentage points
more likely to work at standard jobs than
others. Among nonrecipients, child care
subsidy receipt increases standard work
probability by only 1.8 percentage points.
These findings underscore the important
role of child care subsidies in helping
low-income parents, especially welfare
recipients, find jobs with conventional
or standard schedules. The findings
also point to the need for a substantial
increase in the child care funding in
the new welfare reform bill in order to
enable TANF participants to achieve real
economic security in the long term.

New and Recent Books

International Perspectives
on the U.S. Debate
John Turner

-NEW"Individual accounts are often
debated in a vacuum unrelated to any
real world experience. John Turner,
one of the
nation's foremost
experts on Social
Security, does a
masterful job of
making us look
at the experience
with accounts
already offered in
many countries
but in many
different sizes, shapes, forms, and levels
of risk. Whether you like accounts or
not, you'd better read Dr. Turner's book
if you want to engage in the Social
Security debate in any serious way."
C. Eugene Steuerle, Urban Institute
"The United States is engaged in
the most significant debate over Social
Security that it has had in 50 years.
Fortunately, it doesn't have to rely
on abstract analysis or ideological
arguments. Other countries have had
experience with the types of reforms
we are considering. This very readable
book provides a valuable reference
for people interested in learning about
international experience relevant to the
U.S Social Security reform debate."
Ron Gebhardtsbauer, American
Academy of Actuaries
195 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-283-2
$18 paper ISBN 0-88099-282-4 / 2006.

Job Training
That Gets Results

Licensing
Occupations

Ten Principles of Effective
Employment Programs

Ensuring Quality or
Restricting Competition?

Michael Bernick

Morris M. Kleiner

Recognizing that training
programs can't be all things to all
people, Michael Bernick, a former
director of California's Employment
Development Department, shows the
types of training programs that do
work and for whom. He identifies
ways to improve performance among
Workforce Investment Act (WIA)
contractors while exploring the best
uses for state discretionary WIA funds.
He also describes
what it takes to
make an effective
career ladder
program, how
postemployment
welfare
retention or skill
advancement
programs can
succeed, and
the type of training that workers with
disabilities must go through to get and
retain jobs.
"With fresh insights gleaned from
decades of experience, Michael Bernick
addresses the human-capital challenge
of preparing low-wage workers for the
global economy. His realistic focus
on incentives provides a road map
for future policy." Michael Milken,
chairman, Milken Institute
"In this book, Mr. Bernick goes
beyond the conventional social welfare
and social services strategies for
unemployed and low income workers.
He shows how our nation's job training
systems can be reshaped to get results."
Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-California

"Morris Kleiner has produced
the most thorough evaluation of the
effects of occupational licensing in
years, perhaps ever. In a rational world,
this book would provoke interest
by policymakers and the public in
reconsidering
where
occupational
licensing is
beneficial for
society, and
where it is
beneficial for
those lucky
enough to be
granted licenses
but not for society as a whole." Alan
B. Krueger, Princeton University
"If you thought licensing was a
boring minor issue in the labor market,
this book will make you think again.
Kleiner shows that a larger proportion
of the workforce is licensed than is
in unions, and that licensing raises
wages and lowers employment without
demonstrably improving the quality
of services." Richard B. Freeman,
Harvard University
"In Licensing Occupations, Morris
Kleiner opens the way for a longoverdue national dialogue on the
efficacy of the U.S. professional and
occupational regulatory system. His
work will surely excite numerous and
varied responses from public protection
stakeholders." Pam Brinegar, Council
on Licensure, Enforcement, and
Regulation (CLEAR)

273 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-281-6
$20 paper ISBN 0-88099-280-8 / 2005.

196 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-285-9
$18 pbk. ISBN 0-88099-284-0 / 2006.
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